


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# Albanian Immigrants in Athens: New Survey Evidence on Employment and Integration

Antigone Lyberaki and Thanos Maroukis

*This paper is part of a broader project investigating the security of borders. Its key hypothesis is that the way migrants get on in the host country influences whether borders divide or unite. In this context survey evidence covering 500 Albanians in Athens is presented to track processes of integration and exclusion, to see in other words how perceptions of borders are reflected in social attitudes. The picture emerging is that of a vibrant community characterised by family success, coupled though with significant deficits in collective organisation. Thus the derived benefits for both hosts and migrants would have been greater if greater trust characterised their interaction.*

## Introduction

This article is part of a broader project aiming at enhancing our understanding of the dynamics of migration on the basis of empirical findings. It focuses on Greece's recent immigration experience by shedding light on Albania migrants.

The questions investigated are ultimately questions about borders. Do the dynamics developed between migrants and the native population facilitate the security of external borders? The hypothesis underlying the research can be stated simply: the way migrants get on in the host country influences whether borders unite or divide. Alongside *external* borders is the issue of '*internal* borders' (social inclusion and exclusion/segregation processes). These aspects also influence the security and character of external borders. Hence, the empirical question 'how do migrants fit in' ultimately touches upon a variety of crucial issues linked both to security and prosperity.

Security is a key concept in the contemporary political agenda. Migration tests common preconceptions of the prevailing security discourse. Migrants cross borders, where borders are not only meant as external but also as internal. The meaning of borders is as multifaceted and as controversial as that of security. Demarcating territorial

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or de-territorial borders, 'territorializing' (Harvey 1989) one's own existence, is *the* human 'social practice' (Giddens 1984) under which social interaction is regulated and certain aspects become legitimate. In a sense, demarcating borders is the practice that transforms a collectivity into society. Security alerts and border crossings are shaped by the interaction between host with migrant populations; hence the need for analysis both from the viewpoint of the host societies and also from the point of view of migrants themselves. It follows that the analysis of integration and exclusion patterns concerning migrants constitutes a major field of investigation relating to security and borders issues.

This article presents the initial findings of fieldwork research on Albanian immigrants conducted in Athens between September and November 2003. The survey agency used the 'snowball' sampling procedure, making use of informal networks. Under this established survey technique, an initial list of contacts is used to widen the population of respondents through a 'snowballing' process of acquaintances. The process thus resembles a random walk and under certain conditions can be unbiased. This process can be rigorously defended: in our case *no* sample can be proved to be representative in the strict sense. Given the paucity of concrete data on the Albanian immigrant population in Athens, it is not possible to construct a random sample in the statistical sense. The sample used, however, is arguably 'orthogonal' – in the sense that it has no inherent bias other than it discriminates against newcomers. In other words the conclusions reached are not solely due to the sampling technique but contain useful information for the underlying population.<sup>1</sup>

Using the 500 structured interviews with Albanian immigrants (questionnaires addressed to the head of the household) a broad picture of integration and exclusion experiences and processes can be inferred. Our aim is to investigate how the various perceptions of borders (both from the point of view of those that cross them but also from the point of view of those who remain stationary) are reflected in social practices, attitudes, values and behaviour. Understanding the formation of such social practices is a precondition for meaningful policy recommendations leading to functional and secure borders, conducive to economic prosperity.

In what follows we intend to present the findings relating to Albanian migrants' lives in Greece covering integration patterns as well as cohesion and socio-political performance as an immigrant community. The areas especially focused upon are: living conditions and housing, employment, education, aspects of everyday life, regularization, access to welfare services, property acquisition, trips and remittances to Albania, Internet use, social contacts and participation in associations. Our findings contribute to the broader debate concerning the issues triggered by the migration process and more specifically the implications of migration for the receiving economy (and society) as well as for the welfare of immigrants themselves.

The challenges raised by migration become crystallised in several forms: concerns about an immigrant 'threat' to the natives' jobs and a 'menace' to the host welfare state are typical manifestations of 'the fear of the "Other" in the labour market' (Lyberaki and Pelagidis 2000). On this matter, our findings corroborate earlier findings that immigrants from non-EU countries fulfill the hardest, unhealthiest and low status jobs. However, the low cost of immigrant labour (a characteristic of the early 1990s) is no

longer the case. Wages have tended to increase steadily. Self-employment levels among immigrants appear to be on the increase while, as time goes by, migrants are accessing jobs that were perceived as 'natives only' territory until recently. Furthermore, the social security system has benefited significantly by the immigrant population, the large majority of whom pay social security contributions.

Another concern that the advent of (illegal) immigrants in the 1990s brought to the political discussion in Southern-European countries, has been the consequent strengthening of the *informal economy*. The informal economy, whose size is allegedly equivalent to one-third of the GDP of Greece (Labrianidis and Lyberaki 2001: 98), may eventually jeopardise strategic development objectives. In other words the abundant supply of cheap, easily replaceable and with low qualifications<sup>2</sup> immigrant labour 'traps' the Greek economy in a labour-intensive development path, instead of facilitating an adjustment towards quality and knowledge-intensive paradigms and *an upgrading of the work force* (Labrianidis and Lyberaki 2001: 148–55). However, it is a common observation in migration literature that the above fears of the 'Other' reflect, more than the 'Other' itself, the structural deficits of the host labour market and society which act to block the benefits from immigration.

Our research leads to a conclusion that policies for the management of immigration can substantially expand the benefits from immigration. In this light, we explore the socio-economic implications of regularisation policies as well as of their absence. By exploring the contribution of different factors to immigrants' integration, our research reveals how social spaces are *territorialised* (rendered meaningful, legitimate and distinguishable).

The cultural, economic and sociopolitical factors that influence migrants position in the economy are heavily influenced by their past experiences in Albania (in terms of the size of the community they are coming from, the prevailing gender roles, the skills they have acquired and the prevailing work ethic, to mention but a few). The above, together with the host labour market particularities (jobs segregation along gender and ethnic lines and regularization concerns) eventually give rise to hegemonic attitudes concerning what matters in a job, how to evaluate the personal and social features of different occupations rather than limiting their interest strictly in employment-related characteristics.

Our findings on the social sphere of the Albanian immigrants' lives are indicative of their integration in the host society and demonstrate the continuity of bonds with their homeland. The cohesive Albanian family acts as a vehicle for integration but at the same time functions as a barrier for the smooth inclusion of women into the host society. On the other hand, it appears that the main forms of interaction with the 'homeland' reflect a 'territorial' and family-based pattern instead of potentially more inclusive collectivities such as associations.

## Overview

### *Theoretical, Empirical and Policy Aspects*

There exists a renewed interest in migration in many OECD countries, partly as a result of the need to attract immigrant workers (in both high-skilled and low-skilled activities)

and partly as a result of population ageing (OECD 2004). At the policy front however, the general trend has been in the direction of reinforcing controls both at the borders and internally. The latter are justified on security grounds (in the context of the fight against terrorism triggered by the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States) but also as means to address trafficking and the exploitation of human beings. As a result, the implications of migration for the host as well as for the sending economy and society acquire a new urgency.

The discussion on the costs and benefits of migration for the receiving economy rests very uncomfortably between two extreme positions. On the one hand both the theoretical labour economics literature and the available empirical evidence clearly stress the numerous positive implications for the host economy arising from the arrival of immigrants. These positive effects, however, do not result automatically and their incidence depends on the kind of immigrant labour attracted, as well as the specific features of the host economy. On the other hand, the political debate seems to be evolving on a completely different track. The dominant attitudes to migration in Europe tend to be characterised by prejudice and hostility. Interestingly, instances of ethnic hostility and racism are not related to the economic consequences of migration. Rather they reflect a deeper fear that the European *cultural model* is under attack (ways of life, identities and cultural foundations of social arrangements). What the inflow of immigrants into Europe has served to show is that 'European institutions have grown up around a culture of immobility, and have been designed not only to support it but also to defend it against outsiders' (Burda 2002: 152).

### *Economic Consequences for the Host Country*<sup>3</sup>

When economic migrants have skills and are adaptable and responsive to the requirements and special features of the host economy, then undoubtedly their contribution to the increase of productivity of the economy will be positive. As they contribute to the creation of wealth and add to competitiveness, they also create jobs. Moreover, they lead to benefits by easing bottlenecks in specific segments of the labour markets. Thus, there would not appear to be reasons of disquiet that they would pose a burden, in net terms, to the welfare state. In other words, skilled and adaptable immigrants tend to contribute a lot, while they cost little.

If, alternatively, economic migrants are characterised by low skills then they may 'burden' the host economy. If, in other words, they encounter insurmountable obstacles in adapting to the requirements of employers, then it is likely that the phenomena of marginalisation and wage discrimination will be intensified. This could in turn lead to significant social protection cost for the host society. The casual nature of work and impermanence can further inhibit their adjustment.

### *Do They Create or Usurp Jobs?*

In part the question whether immigration leads to an increase in jobs overall or if it leads to an equal job loss depends on whether immigrants' skills can give rise to a

multiplier-like effect or not. Much depends, though, on the host economy: what its needs are, what type of work corresponds to its structures and momentum, what are its future needs for productive restructuring. Whether the final balance comes out positive or negative is not certain, but depends on a range of factors.

*It Depends Not Only on Who They Are, But Also on How They Are Received*

The answer to the above ultimately decides whether and by how much wages are compressed. If the immigration inflow has a multiplier effect on economic activity, then the demand for labour will also rise. However, the multiplier effect does not solely depend on the immigrants, but also on their employers. If, in other words, businesses use the increase labour supply to defend an otherwise untenable market position then multiplier effects go away. In this case immigration does not act as a development springboard.

The implications for the sending economy and society constitute the other side of the economic effects of migration. It is often argued that, beside the obvious positive effects through remittances and the curtailment of unemployment, there are numerous invisible negative consequences. The weakening of human capital together with the 'brain drain' are the most often quoted examples of negative consequences. Are these claims well-founded?

It is a fact that those emigrating are neither the poorest nor the most desperate. In the majority of cases, the decision to emigrate is part of the households overall strategy. That decision concerns the viability and welfare of the household as a whole. What evidence exists in the developing countries points that the emigration decision was associated with a visible increase in overall welfare for the entire household. This increase in welfare involves not only an increase in monetary resources, but also protection against sudden income fluctuations. In other words, emigration helps to reduce the households' exposure to risk due to external economic factors.

If the theoretical case on the advantages of migration for the host economy is somewhat guarded,<sup>4</sup> the available empirical evidence is much more forthright. On the issue of the supposedly adverse impact of foreign workers on the natives' wages different methodologies and different economies in question seem to produce slightly different results; what is important to bear in mind however, is that in all cases studied, the negative impact, if any, tends to be very small (and hence manageable). EU estimates suggest that a 10 per cent increase of foreign workers is likely to cause *at most* a 1 per cent wage loss (if not a gain) to natives. Similar findings have been produced in the US context, where there is ample evidence that immigration generates a negligible pressure on wages (with a possible exception of wages at the bottom of the distribution).<sup>5</sup> Now, as far as the displacement effect is concerned, it seems that the EU natives' chances of finding a job or exit unemployment are apparently unaffected by immigration. In the US evidence suggests that migration flows might trigger native population flows as a response (Boeri 2002).

These are hardly surprising findings. The reason is that the 'Cassandra scenario' (involving job displacement and downward pressure on wage levels) assumes that

everything else remains the same (the famous *ceteris paribus* of much of economics analysis). But in the real world nothing remains the same, and thus it would be unrealistic to assume that the whole burden of adjustment is born exclusively by the labour market. In fact, technology as well as output composition (not to mention output volume) may change as a response to the inflow of migrants, thus leaving employment and wage levels unaffected. In the EU context in particular, where labour market flexibility is relatively weak<sup>6</sup> (at least by US standards) there is a high probability that immigrants contribute to an increase in jobs and more efficient production solutions because they supply a flexible labour pool.

So, the economic argument in favour of freer migration is very strong. Much of its intellectual opposition is based on a fallacy, known as the 'wage fund fallacy'.<sup>7</sup> It rests on the notion that there exists a given and fixed amount that employers can spend and will spend on labour. Every additional worker thus 'crowds out' someone else who would have been employed otherwise. As Tinios (2004) succinctly argues, in the less sophisticated versions the effect is directly on workers or hours worked, while in the more sophisticated versions it may operate through the wage bill (by eroding wage levels). These arguments are neither theoretically nor empirically founded. On the contrary, the available evidence stresses the potential benefits from migration.

What is important to bear in mind, however, is that the degree to which migrants contribute to growth, prosperity and job creation is closely linked to the degree of acceptance they enjoy in host societies. In other words, immigrants contribute more positively when the host societies actively accept their presence (and contribution) (Papademetriou 2003a). Yet, the fact remains that popular perceptions of the costs of immigration are difficult to dislodge. This is clearly the case when (real or imaginary) economic frictions between natives and migrants are exacerbated by non-economic factors such as fear of terrorism and clashes of culture.

### Migration in Greece: Facts and Policies

Large-scale immigration to Greece has only become an issue recently. For the greater part of the twentieth century, Greece was predominantly a country people emigrated *from*. However, there was a gradual reversal in the last three decades, with *net* inflows being registered. The inward flows in the 1970s and 1980s consisted of returning Greek guest workers, members of the Greek diaspora from Egypt or elsewhere, as well as political exiles from the time of the Civil War of the 1940s.

This pattern was disrupted by a wave of ethnic Greeks from the former USSR (mainly the Southern Soviet republics) and Albania. Gradually, Greece was transformed into a migrant-destination country. This process took off after the events of 1989 in the former socialist countries. The great majority of migrants come from neighbouring Balkan countries, though waves of economic migrants and asylum seekers have also been arriving from eastern Europe, the former USSR, the Middle East and several Asian and African countries. In some cases (especially early on in the process), Greece was a stepping-stone on their migration route westward; increasingly, though, migrants see it in terms of long-term residence or even permanent settlement.

In 2001 the estimated stock of foreigners living legally in Greece was 762,200, amounting to approximately 7 per cent of the total population (OECD 2004). Ten years earlier their share was a modest 1.6 per cent of the population. It is further estimated that out of the total foreign population, 413,000 foreign-born persons entered the country for employment reasons (almost 55 per cent). Table 1 summarises the picture.

In many ways, the Greek experience has much in common with the other southern EU member states (Portugal, Spain and Italy). Apart from their similar socioeconomic characteristics and economic evolution, southern Europe shares similar experiences of migration, to an extent that allows reference to a specific Southern European immigration model (King, Lazaridis and Tsardanidis 2000).<sup>8</sup> Many of the characteristics and trends of contemporary migration clearly apply in the Greek case. First, the East–West dimension dominates. Second, most of the immigrants are clandestine, at least initially. Third, the new forms of mobility are also evident: transit, temporary, seasonal and cross-border migration, as well as ‘tourists-workers’ and sex migrants. Finally, geographic proximity and cultural or historical links with countries of origin and migrant populations (in terms of religion, ethnicity, etc.) can also be identified.

In terms of geographical location, the greatest number is concentrated in Attica (the Athens area) and secondarily in Central Macedonia (Thessaloniki). A key fact is that the two large urban centres attract the vast majority of migrants. Out of those who applied for legalisation in 1999, 65 per cent come from Albania, and a further 18 per cent from Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Poland and Georgia. This concentration signals the overwhelming role of proximity in migration to Greece—a factor which further allows and facilitates ‘circular migration’ and seasonal migration patterns. In any case, the overwhelming majority comes from the Balkans (76.4 per cent), and most notably from Albania (65 per cent). It is important to note that Albania has dense commercial

**Table 1** First Results of the 2001 Population Census, Greece (Thousands)

Stock of foreign nationals by nationality	Total	Number who entered Greece for employment purposes
Albania	438.0	270.7
Bulgaria	35.1	27.5
Georgia	22.9	11.1
Romania	22.0	17.3
United States	18.1	3.7
Russian Federation <sup>a</sup>	17.5	7.8
Cyprus	17.4	5.0
Other	191.1	100.1
Total	762.2	413.2
Of which women	346.6	168.6

<sup>a</sup>Ethnic Greeks from the Russian Federation are not included, as they are nationals.

Source: National Statistical Service of Greece, Population Census 2001, cited in OECD 2004: 204.

and investment flows with Greece. The particularity of the Greek experience lies in the fact that not only do the majority of immigrants come from neighbouring countries, but also that, there exist both historical and contemporary linkages in the region.

The concentration on the Albanian element distinguishes sharply migration to Greece from the equivalent phenomenon in the rest of southern Europe. Close links between Greece and Albania (flows of goods, services, capital and people) combined with the *size* of these flows (non-negligible in national macro terms for both countries) to form the picture of a two-way relationship where what happens in Albania feeds back to Greece in the sphere of the economy, the society and in international relations. In other words, from the point of view of growth dynamics, Greece and Albania constitute elements of a closed circuit.

Policies for the management of migration flows have gone through various phases, following a 'trial-and-error' pattern. Initially, policy was designed on the assumption that immigrants' flows were temporary (Castles and Miller 1998). Greece kept denying its transformation into an immigration country long after that was established as a fact (Fakiolas 1997: 4). Indicative of this tendency has been the repressive approach of the Act 1975/1991 titled 'Entry-exit, stay, employment, deportation of foreigners, recognition procedure of foreigner refugees and other provisions' (Georgoulas 2001: 206) that cast its shadow on immigrants' lives in Greece during the 1990s. In this law, predominantly concerned with the control of the foreign labour inflows and the penalisation and deportation of those who entered in Greece illegally, there was little or no room for integration policy.

1997 marked the beginning of a new more pragmatic approach. Two presidential decrees regulated the two phases of the first Greek regularisation programme in 1997–98. The limited success of this first regularization (low regularization rate) did not lead to legislation proper until 2001. The Act 2910/2001 on 'the admission and residence of foreigners in Greece and the acquisition of Greek nationality through naturalisation' and the modification of some of its provisions by Law 3013/2002 constitute the main pieces of legislation for immigration in Greece. Responsibility for implementing migration policy was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation. Despite the facilitation of family reunion and the decentralization of procedures,<sup>9</sup> the process is still vague, 'unfriendly' and time-consuming (difficulties in coordination, unclear specification of responsibility and lack of transparency). The latest decree (27-10-2003) responds to the demand for a longer period between the renewals of work permits by extending it into two years. It also raises the required days of paid work to 300 (from 150).

The 2001 Act 'lays down the conditions for the immigrants' rights and social obligations (nine-year compulsory schooling for children, compulsory insurance to be taken out by employers, better access to courts, social services and health care)' (OECD 2004). It also links immigration to the labour market; the Public Employment Service (OAED) is expected to prepare an annual report on vacancies and skills needs so as to set quota for work permits. In an effort to combat illegal employment of immigrants, fines to employers have now become heavier. A significant development at the planning level is the setting up of the Immigration Policy Institute (IMEPO), which is

responsible for conducting surveys and studies in the immigration field and implementing aspects of policy integration.

A potentially important policy tool whose implementation is still pending is the Operational Action Plan for Immigrants. This is a necessary step for consistent implementation of policies across a wide spectrum of fields. The measures focus on immigrants' integration as means for promoting employment and social cohesion targets. The Action Plan for 'the social integration of migrants for the 2002–2005 period' addresses the issues of immigrants' qualifications gap, access into the labour market and adequacy of social support services. Indicative objectives include

- (a) the creation of training and information centres for migrants and administrators, (b) initiatives aimed at promoting better access to training (e.g. language and vocational training courses), (c) improvement of access to health care for migrants and d) the creation of emergency centres to assist migrants in situations of distress. (OECD 2004)

### Albanians in Athens: Living Conditions and Housing

Evidence from our empirical research on Albanian immigrants in Athens suggests that housing and living conditions present a constantly improving picture. There do not exist ghetto situations nor non-go areas in the urban landscape of the capital. Partly due to the phenomenon of vertical social differentiation of residence<sup>10</sup> (as opposed to the horizontal segregation evidenced elsewhere in Europe) locals and immigrants inhabit the same neighbourhoods and the same residence blocks.

For immigrants, perhaps more than for the indigenous population, the home is the prime site of hospitality, while they seem to be reluctant to express dissatisfaction with the quality of their residence. In our sample over three-quarters (78 per cent) of Albanians live with their families. This is high for an immigrant population and, when compared to older samples taken four to five years earlier (e.g. Labrianidis and Lyberaki 2001) imply a rapid process of settling down – including both family formation and reunification. This development accounts for the importance accorded to the family and to family values in the interpretation of many of our findings. In itself this process of familial normalisation is probably the most effective single tribute to the success of regularisation.

Furthermore, our findings reveal a close link between the length of stay in Athens and the quality of the residence. Initially people settle as guests with friends and later on they move to their own place. Since the incidence of home ownership remains rare, mobility prevails, allowing individuals and families to move to better homes when they can afford them. And last, but not least, our findings lend credibility to earlier findings in Thessaloniki (Labrianidis and Lyberaki 2001), as they document a clear improvement of residence characteristics over time (more space, better condition and higher floor).

The residence is the first location in the new environment completely controlled by the immigrant. The housing conditions are to a certain extent emblematic of the immigrants' integration in the host country. Moreover, since the house is a site of social control, it represents a shared space of *meaning* and *trust*,<sup>11</sup> a space that people demarcate in order to render it identifiable, familiar and secure.

In certain respects the cultural management of space prevailing in the country of origin is reproduced in the new residential territory. For example, the *hospitality* the Albanian immigrants offer to their guests (in this case, the interviewers)<sup>12</sup> reflects the mountain laws of the Kanun on escorting the guest up to the limits of one's village and on the significance of the guest in the Albanian culture. It simultaneously constitutes one of the main self-identification narratives the Albanian immigrants *perform* in response to negative stereotypes about them.

Interestingly, the discussion of housing problems in the interviews has revealed a clear reluctance on the part of immigrants to admit to problems or to express dissatisfaction with the quality of their residence. Recurring answers of the kind 'we are fine here, no problem' may indicate two things: first, that housing conditions are seen as acceptable or amenable, and second, that immigrants are anxious not to differ, or better 'to be regarded as equal'. All things taken into consideration, however, it should be stressed that half of the respondents answered that they do not face any housing problems.

Linked to the housing conditions is the issue of perceived criminality, the 'imagined borders' (widely held views of certain areas as dangerous) with which the native population has demarcated areas of Athens (Harvey 1989; Giddens 1990; Psimmenos 1995, 1998) in order to conceptualise oneself before the immigrants and sustain a certain 'social class' balance. There is evidence that immigrants themselves adopt the 'blame-the-foreigner' discourse on criminality.

Given that in the capital rents are not low, the rents mentioned in our survey—nearly half between 201 and 300 euros, while an important 37 per cent below 200 euros—are at the lower end of scale. There is little evidence of overcharging. It should be added that some of the lower-rent arrangements involve the provision of cleaning services in exchange. The rent constitutes a significant financial burden for approximately 40 per cent of respondents whose monthly household income is less than 900 euros (the latter comprising 34.2 per cent of the sample's population). Overcrowding is a minor issue for over half of our respondents and applies only to large families (of households with five to seven members—the latter comprising 30.5 per cent of the sample).

Although obviously the neighbourhood affects housing conditions, and there are areas with higher immigrant density, it is clear that there are no ghetto situations. Our findings (despite the bias one would expect due to snowball sampling) suggest that there is a wide dispersion of immigrants throughout Athens, although a large number (37.4 per cent) reside in the centre of the city. Furthermore, reported housing problems do not refer to any neighbourhood in particular; their incidence is not linked to immigrant density. The characteristics of the neighbourhood play a minor role in determining the quality-of-life perception of our respondents. More important is the existence of relatives/friends in that area.

An interesting finding is the mobility and improvement of housing conditions over time (Table 2). While clearly the incidence of home ownership is low (it is slightly higher among ethnic Greeks from Southern Albania, while self-employed people are more likely to buy property than employees) there is a clear improvement in housing

**Table 2** Period in Current Residence

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative percent
< 2 years	105	21.2	21.2
2 years	79	16.0	37.2
3–5 years	193	39.0	76.2
6+ years	118	23.8	100.0
Total	495	100.0	

Note: 14 respondents were living as guests.

conditions linked to the length of stay in Athens. It appears that the lack of property ties induces greater mobility, which in turn proves beneficial for those concerned. Only 18 per cent of our sample population remained stationary. Most of our respondents have changed houses during their stay while the move was made to a bigger house and/or to a better house (often on higher floors). The above is indicative of upward socio-economic mobility.

With regard to *household durables*, most of the households have central heating, one in three owns a car, 83 per cent have mobile phone and nearly half have conventional phones. The overwhelming majority has TV(s), refrigerator and washing machine, while half of the households have video/DVD and stereo. The incidence of PC ownership is not high (7.3 per cent). So the general picture is not substantially different from the situation characterising the natives. The only two exceptions are conventional phones and very few dishwashers. The latter is indicative of prevailing cultural values rather than lack of financial means.<sup>13</sup>

### Employment and Income

The role of employment for economic immigrants can hardly be overstressed. Similarly, employment characteristics constitute the main avenue for (smooth or otherwise) social integration and economic success. The objective of this section is to examine the dynamics of integration and exclusion from the Greek labour market concerning migrant men and women.

Finding a job is the obvious first step for labour market integration. As anticipated, the employment participation rate among our sample is high, particularly so among men (96.1 per cent).

Women also display a considerably higher employment participation rate compared with Greek women (65 per cent compared to approximately 40 per cent (Table 3). Interestingly, economic inactivity appears to be a 'luxury' some women are capable of affording, although they used to be economically active earlier (in their home country and/or in Greece at an earlier time). Taking into account the higher employment participation rates among Albanian immigrants compared to the native population, an interesting analogy emerges. Women's employment participation rate lags by 31 per cent from those of men among both immigrants and natives alike. The

**Table 3** Current Employment (Males and Females)

Male employment	Men	Percent	Female employment	Women	Percent
Industry, primary + tertiary sector	101	30.5	Industry, waitress, kitchen maid, primary sector	21	11.9
Business, self-employment, other similar to native's paid work	81	24.5	Self-employment, office employee, other	34	19.3
Constructions sector	136	41.1	Domestic services	60	34.1
Unemployed	13	3.9	Unemployed/housewives	61	34.7
Total	331	100.0	Total	176	100.0

above suggests that there could be similarities in the sphere of gender roles and shared values that produce similar gender-based inequalities within both Greek and Albanian communities.

Our respondents were for the most part paying social security contributions. Again some differences were apparent between men and women. While 88.4 per cent of men regularly paid social security contributions, the respective percentage of women is much lower (by 22 per cent). This is partly attributable to the kind of jobs that women do, jobs closely associated with service provision to households, activities firmly within the realm of the grey economy. In interpreting these data one should bear in mind the generally low level of compliance of *all* workers, especially in the kind of occupations Albanians are concentrated in.

The main occupations for men are wage employment in construction (41.1 per cent), in manufacturing and tertiary sectors (30.5 per cent) and a surprisingly high percentage in self-employment or business-owner categories or paid work that is usually considered outside the reach of immigrants (24.5 per cent).<sup>14</sup> Women work primarily in domestic services (34.1 per cent) and manufacturing together with restaurants and hotels (11.9 per cent). Again the share of self-employment together with office employment appears to be relatively high, reaching 19.3 per cent. The above, compared with earlier findings elsewhere, suggest that Albanian immigrants are entering professions and types of employment (self-employment) that were previously virtually closed for them. In terms of their careers aspirations and in the context of self employment, it appears that Albanians become increasingly similar to their hosts.

The process of employment adjustment, however, is difficult and multifaceted, full of achievements but also set-backs and hesitant steps. Indicative in this respect is the finding that most of our self-employed respondents try to camouflage their identity in their everyday economic activities. This applies also to the experience of Albanians doing other 'non-migrants dominated' jobs. An Albanian woman working as a primary school teacher reported 'even though I had a [Greek] university degree with 9 [excellent], when I said I am Albanian they used to tell me "ok we will call you" and of course they never did ... Finally I got a job in a small private school ... In order not to stir the children's curiosity I have adopted a Greek name.' The fact that 26 per cent of the

sample is addressed by a Greek name at work is indicative of *both sides'* urge to minimise unfamiliarity.

Stability of employment is another characteristic of our respondents' work experience. Nine per cent of our sample experienced job change over the past 12 months, while there appears to exist a three-year cycle in which a fair proportion of the immigrant population moves jobs (a quarter of the total). Continuity and stability need not necessarily indicate a high level of satisfaction from the current job. In fact, among the most prevalent occupations (construction for men and domestic services for women) we encountered the highest dissatisfaction percentages.

An interesting question thus arises: Why is dissatisfaction not translated into greater job turnover?

First, job insecurity. Family obligations discourage most construction workers from seeking a different kind of employment (two out of three respondents). Although they consider their income adequate, they feel insecure as far as their future employment prospects are concerned. Indeed, during the Olympics-related construction boom of 2003, they were afraid of labour market problems after the Olympics. Therefore, they prefer to stick with the job they already have, so as to minimise future unemployment risks.

Second, high remuneration, especially if the possibility of contribution evasion increases net pay. This holds especially for women in domestic service, a higher percentage of whom do not pay social security contributions, who stress the fact that 'the money is good'.

Third, personal loyalty to peers. For both men and women, the fact that somebody (a friend or relative) vouched for them and recommended them for their current job appears to be a strong deterrent to quitting. The links men develop in construction; a sector with dense concentration of Albanian workers, are a case in point. It is no coincidence that the members of the most active associations of Albanians are employed in construction.

Finally, a factor inhibiting job search is related to institutional borders: some immigrants cannot afford to lose a day's work not so much due to foregone income but mainly due to foregone social insurance contributions, known as 'stamps'; a minimum number of stamps per year is a legal prerequisite for legalisation.

An important factor is the pride men derive from being employed, especially evident in construction. It is seen as a 'proper man's job'. Regardless of their current level of satisfaction with their job they suggest that '*we are here to work ... and a job is a job*' and '*I should not say that I do not like this job. After all, it is work ... a craft I've learned*'. This pride-in-work narrative could be an effort to construct a collective '*We*' against negative stereotypes. In an environment generally seen as alien and alienating, work for the Albanian has resumed its classical function of bestowing identity. The work place is thus the principal locality where the Albanian immigrant community can retrieve its dignity and re-narrate its identity.

So, the big picture of the employment situation is one of clear advancement, at least at the personal level. In spite of concentration in particular occupations, there is evidence of migrants entering new occupations and types of work, the most important being self-employment.

**Table 4** Monthly Household Incomes in 2003

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative percent
< 300 euros	4	0.8	0.8
300–599 euros	45	8.8	9.6
600–899 euros	107	21.0	30.6
900–1,200 euros	131	25.7	56.4
1,201–1,499 euros	80	15.7	72.1
1,500–1,799 euros	62	12.2	84.3
1,800–2,199	23	4.5	88.8
2,200 and above	13	2.6	91.4
NA	44	8.6	100.0
Total	509	100.0	

Turning to the issue of household income the picture drawn from our sample suggests that approximately half of our respondents fall within the 900–1200 euros monthly family income as an average of the year 2003 (Table 4). The median income is just above 900 EUR per month, while the distribution is not very skewed. In their own words they ‘make ends meet’, while a group representing slightly over 33 per cent report monthly family income over (half of them substantially over) 1,200 euros. However, quite a few also suggested that making ends meet has become harder nowadays partly due to the introduction of the euro and also as a result of growing needs on their part, a sentiment recorded in all surveys of the native population.

The main vehicle for getting a job is through friends and relatives, while newspapers advertisements also surface quite prominently (Table 5). Immigrant associations appear to be completely insignificant in the job-seeking process, while for those familiar with Greek data the 7 per cent who found their job through state organisations sounds remarkably high.

In a sense, this favourable labour market situation is reflected in the reported intentions concerning the length of intended stay in Greece. Most of our respondents

**Table 5** Job Searching Patterns

How did you find your job?	Percent
State organisations	7.2
Private organisations	4.1
Alone	24.7
Asked friends/relatives	77.3
Immigrant associations	1.0
Newspaper ads	20.6
NA	3.1

suggest that they would like to stay permanently. This finding is at variance from the respective picture in earlier research (in Thessaloniki and elsewhere; see Labrianidis and Lyberaki 2001) and may be indicative both of the expectations but also of the commitments they have entered. The prime and most important factor tying them to Greece seems to be the existence of children and considerations relating to their education and future prospects. Obviously, other things matter too, such as family in Albania or property in Albania.

### **Education and Language Skills**

Education constitutes one of the main vehicles, apart from employment, for improving one's employment opportunities. Education refers to two main aspects. The first is the level of skills and educational achievement of immigrants. And the second their participation in continued education or training schemes (or lifelong learning).

The question of skill composition of our sample is crucial both on economic performance and policy grounds. In line with earlier findings on Albanians in Greece (e.g. Labrianidis and Lyberaki 2001) the skill and education picture emerging from our sample is one in which Albanians are educated and have acquired skills prior to their arrival in Greece. 63.8 per cent of men and 65.2 per cent of women were graduates of a full (12-year) secondary education and technical school (where they trained for specific professions). A high percentage (15 per cent of men and 13.4 per cent of women) hold a university degree (from Albania) or a vocational school degree (again from Albania). Elementary school education level applies only to 1.2 per cent of men and 10.4 per cent of women. Indicative of the overall educational qualifications situation is the finding that 4.1 per cent of our respondents (here we refer to adults only) use regularly the Internet.

The relatively high educational level notwithstanding, there exists a gap between qualifications on the one hand and type of job performed on the other. This is particularly the case with university graduates.

The other side of the qualifications picture is the continuation of learning and skills acquisition. Interestingly, the percentage of attendance at any kind of continued education scheme is higher among immigrants than among Greeks. The percentage of immigrants attending or having attended educational courses over the last year is 6.7 per cent (the respective figure for Greeks over 25 years old is around 1 per cent, the lowest in the EU). Younger people, mostly in the 18–24 age cohort, are more likely to attend a course. The existence of family increases the propensity to participate in education. 85.3 per cent of the immigrants attending a course live with their family

The majority of the adult respondents speak and have a good understanding of the Greek language, though fewer write it equally well. Most learn it in the context of work and via television.

### **Quality of Everyday Life and Networks**

The constituents of everyday life reflect the utilisation of free time, and in particular the access to several channels of goods/services and networks enhancing or obstructing

**Table 6** Patterns of Learning Host Language for Adult Respondents

How did (do) you learn Greek? (3 choices)	Percent
Through their children	22.3
Through TV	50.0
Greek press	5.3
In the context of work	68.5
Other (courses, dictionaries)	17.9
NA	1.1

the participation of individual immigrants in the host society. Furthermore, they reveal the nexus of connections and linkages with their home country.

Free time activities are dominated by TV watching and visiting friends/relatives for both men and women. Women are responsible for cooking, housework and the children (if any), they tend to read slightly more, and generally are more involved in indoor activities than men. The uneven distribution of outdoors entertainment between men and women testifies to distinct gender roles (Table 7).

The fact that the overwhelming majority of Albanian immigrants watch mainly Greek TV makes TV a vehicle of participation and familiarisation with local politics and social issues. It is via the Greek television channels that they acquire local knowledge and language skills. They also watch Albanian channels, though to a lesser extent. This should not mean that their bonds with Albania are broken. It rather indicates that they develop new ways of seeing their own familiar reality within the lens of the more recently acquired experience in Greece. As a respondent put it, 'We, now, see things there [in Albania] with a critical eye. Migration is a big school'. 40.9 per cent of immigrants from Albania in our sample usually vote for Albanian elections while 72.1 per cent report that they would like to be able to vote in Greek elections.

The development of a distinct political culture has not materialised as yet. This is reflected to the very low participation rates in associations and trade unions, while newspaper reading remains moderate. They keep in touch with socio-political developments in Albania mainly via relatives and friends and not via networks of collective character (associations, Internet chat-rooms, Albanian television and newspapers). Remittances to Albania are sent via 'informal means' and are a means for family

**Table 7** Outdoors Entertainment Broken Down by Gender

Uses outdoor entertainment	Males	Females	Total
No	144 (43.5%)	146 (82.0%)	290 (57.0)
Yes	187 (56.5%)	32 (18.0%)	219(43.0%)
Total	331 (100%)	178 (100%)	509 (100%)

**Table 8** Remittance to Albania

	Per cent
How did (do) you send money to Albania?	
Personally	21.7
Relatives	47.6
Friends	31.6
Banks	18.4
Agencies	1.9
Post	3.8
Other	1.4
NA	0.5
For what reasons did you send money?	
Sustaining family	82.9
Buying land	6.2
Investments	7.6
Other	13.3

sustenance (82.9 per cent declare so; see Table 6) rather than for investment purposes (see Appendix). It also appears that the amount of remittances is declining over time.

### Access to Services

Immigrants' access to services constitutes a crucial indicator of participation in the host civil society. Here we focus on access to health (welfare) services, banking and the labour directorates of prefectures and municipalities responsible for legalisation procedures.

The general picture reveals no problems in accessing existing health facilities. A large majority goes to the state hospitals and are financed by their social security fund, while quite a few also go to private doctors.

The fact that three-quarters (74.1 per cent) of Albanian immigrants have a bank account demonstrates their integration in the mainstream modes of transaction. This integration is illustrated by the fact that in branches of the National Bank of Greece (the largest Greek Bank) ATM machines employ two foreign languages: English and Albanian. The market, after all, is the most objective indicator of the integration of Albanian immigrants in the Greek economy.

If the economy has integrated Albanians readily, this is not the case with the notorious unfriendly Greek bureaucracy. The bureaucracy was called to manage the main instrument to immigrant integration, viz the legalisation process. The way it responded frequently seemed (especially to those not familiar with its workings) to attain results alienating applicants. Nearly 70 per cent report problems in the legalisation process. One-quarter of the permit holders declaring that they have solved these problems are either ethnic Greek Albanians (who have to renew their documents every three years, rather than every year or six months like the rest) or those who decided to pay a lawyer

to deal with the bureaucracy (13.1 per cent). The difficulties involved in the regularisation programmes have adverse implications both for immigrants and also for the host economy.

### Social Contracts and Associations

Social contacts underlie the formation of social attitudes and social outcomes alike. Here we analyse two specific factors that affect to a certain extent the frequency and character of social contacts with natives, co-nationals and other immigrants. These factors constitute demarcating 'practices' in the collective imagination.

Immigrants from Albania who live with their family are more likely to have frequent social contacts with natives, compared to those living alone. This indicates the significance of family for 'acceptance' in the Greek society (Psimmenos 1995; Kasimati 2000). Family is also one of the main narratives helping to form a bond within the Albanian immigrant community and more or less affects the frequency of social contacts. It has not been uncommon in our interviews for people to connect criminality with unmarried people (especially men). Indicative of the importance of marriage in the Albanian population is that marriage appears to be a prime objective for men as well as for women. A 28-year-old man who recently lapsed into illegality (expired work permit) after eight years' stay in Greece, in an attempt to evaluate his migration experience, reported that 'had I not moved from Albania, I would have progressed [in my life]. Now, I am still single'.

The immigrants' *types of employment* have created different opportunities for social integration for men and women: construction workers associate more with co-nationals while immigrants in more prestigious jobs are *slightly more* likely to have social contacts with natives. The majority of women (house-cleaners, domestic helpers) have fewer contacts with co-nationals. In the words that a respondent working as a primary school teacher reasons her infrequent social contacts with Albanians, 'in order to have Albanian friends, you have to have a job similar to theirs. How else are you going to find Albanian friends?'

The 'pride in work', one of the main migration narratives of Albanians, often inhibits the participation in associations. 'We don't do *these* things [associations participation], we are here to work'. There appears to be a 'denial' of political identity. Denial of political identity has become a symbol for keeping the Albanian immigrants out of exposure, *out of sight* (Psimmenos 1995, Kaplani 2001) and therefore out of trouble.<sup>15</sup> It is no coincidence that the most popular associational activity of the immigrant community (the cultural activities occurring once/twice a year) lacks socio-political character. This ambivalence towards associations and other forms of collective action is not confined to Albanians. It could be argued that Greeks exemplify the very same characteristics.

It would be a mistake to view immigrants from Albania as a homogenous whole. Apart from differences arising from distinct geographical and ethnic backgrounds, we have noticed that the institutionally framed perceptions in Greece concerning Albanians are contributing to the emergence of a separate category: the *Vorioepiotes* (ethnic Greeks from southern Albania) (Table 9). The latter enjoy higher acceptance

**Table 9** Social Contacts with Co-nationals Broken Down by Ethnic Group

Frequency of social contacts with Albanians (non-relatives)	Ethnic group		
	<i>Vorioepiotes</i>	Albanians	Total
Every day			
Number	20	225	245
% of frequency	8.2	91.8	100.0
% of ethnic group	33.3	50.2	48.2
Often			
Number	21	148	169
% within rows	12.4	87.6	100.0
% of ethnic group	35.0	33.0	33.3
Relatively often			
Number	5	31	36
% of frequency	13.9	86.1	100.0
% of ethnic group	8.3	6.9	7.1
Rarely, never			
Number	14	44	58
% of frequency	24.1	75.9	100.0
% of ethnic group	23.3	9.8	11.4
Total			
Number	60	448	508
% of frequency	11.8	88.2	100.0
% of ethnic group	100.0	100.0	100.0

from Greek society. In the words of one of our respondents: ‘When you go to ask for work, they ask what you are, Albanian or Vorioepiotes. If you say Albanian ... [they reject you]’. And also, ‘Due to this preference for Vorioepiotes there is now a hatred between us’. The fact that nearly one in four Albanians with Greek descent appears to have rare or no social contacts with other Albanians manifests the reproduction of ethnically distinguished categories carried from Albania in the host context. In addition to these, one should also consider other types of ‘borders’ demarcating the newly arrived immigrants from the earlier flows. Indicative are the words of a woman working together with Pakistanis: ‘I am not the same as the Pakistani who’s been here only for six months. There should be different rules applying for those of us who live here longer.’

### Conclusions: Functional Borders Revisited

This article is about the social and economic experiences of Albanian immigrants in Athens. It touches upon a broad spectrum of issues, ranging from security and borders to economic success, gender roles and social inclusion. The overwhelming

thrust of our evidence draws a picture of a vibrant community whose main trait is the combination of individual success coupled however with collective deficits. The evidence speaks of hard-working individuals striving for acceptance and managing to improve their condition in every respect as time goes by. The economic picture is unambiguous: work availability, improvement of incomes, access to social insurance via contributions, home equipment comparable to the natives. Immigrants gradually enter jobs and positions previously beyond their reach, although they often have to hide their identity in the initial phase so as to gain easier acceptance. Looking more like Greeks is both an objective and an actual evolving process.

If obscuring their real identity is one way of gaining acceptance, the development of a strong 'pride-in-work' narrative constitutes the commonest reaction to the negative stereotypes haunting them. Taken to extremes, this pride-in-work ethic hinders the creation and development of extra-family links and associations. The majority of our respondents expressed lack of trust in their own associations and a reluctance to cooperate with non-relatives in the context of collective forms of representation. It could be argued that coming from a low-trust culture and arriving in a low-trust society reinforces certain characteristics in the course of the immigration experience. So, while our respondents have so far proved successful in attaining individual goals, they have been less successful in forging a collectivity on the basis of trust and cooperation. Family continues to constitute the main point of reference in people's lives, while both men and women attach great importance to marriage.

Paradoxically, probably the strongest shared negative experience stems from dealings with the very mechanism designed to integrate them – namely the Greek bureaucracy in the context of legalisation. The legalisation process has proved difficult, time consuming and expensive for immigrants. It also reinforces their vulnerability and insecurity. People feel 'cornered' and reduced to impotence. This ambience is hardly conducive to long-term planning and investment of any kind: in skills acquisition, in consumer durables, in knowledge, to mention but a few. It also feeds short-termist attitudes on the part of employers. Such attitudes may prove detrimental to an overall upgrading of the domestic production nexus. In other words, such attitudes may eventually inhibit the modernisation process in Greece.

A tentative conclusion that could be drawn from the above analysis is that although immigrants are doing well individually and although collectively the Greek economy benefits from their presence, the derived benefits for all parties involved would be considerably greater had greater trust and cooperation together with networks of civic engagement developed more densely. The implied benefits for the immigrants themselves are almost self-evident. Relying on support networks wider and broader than family creates a much more solid basis for solidarity and support, translating into more vigorous economic success and also greater bargaining power. There are missed benefits for the host economy and society as well. There exists ample evidence that migration has the greatest value added to the receiving economies and societies in the case where positive attitudes towards migrants become the rule in both general public opinion and policy perceptions. Fear is the worst counsellor for natives, new comers and 'relatives back home' alike.

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## Notes

- [1] Snowball sample methodology does, unavoidably, have a lower probability of inclusion or recent migrants. In our case, however, this bias against newcomers presents a minor problem since we are interested in longer-term characteristics acquired through time.
- [2] Immigrant labour force is no longer especially cheap.
- [3] A review of the theoretical case can be found in Borjas (1994, 2000).
- [4] An extreme scenario trying to calculate the overall economic effect of free migration in the world economy (on the basis of 1977 data) suggests that entirely unrestricted migration, sufficient to equalise wages and the marginal productivity of labour across the 179 countries considered, could more than double global GDP: the change would have added between \$5 trillion and \$16 trillion to global income of \$8 trillion (cited in *The Economist*, 6 May 2004). Along the same lines, Dani Rodrik (2002) has argued that even a modest freeing up of migration would create gains for the world economy far greater than those following the gains from liberalising trade. (314–317)
- [5] This is the case only in a situation where natives and foreigners compete for the same labour market segment, a hypothesis that does not hold in the majority of cases.
- [6] The low geographical and functional mobility of natives.
- [7] This point is made by Tinios (2004).
- [8] In the last three decades, southern European economies were incorporated in the ‘developed block’. Hence, the post-war ‘development rift’ shifted to the south: this imagined line, from Istanbul to the Straits of Gibraltar, passing from Cyprus, Crete, Sicily and Sardinia could be characterised today as Europe’s ‘*Rio Grande*’ (King 2000).
- [9] Residence permits are now issued by a regional secretary-general, following consultation with the newly created decentralised immigration committees (OECD 2004: 205).
- [10] The Athenian apartment house reproduces literally social vertical segmentation – with more affluent groups inhabiting the upper floors and the Albanians on the ground floor.
- [11] See Foucault (1991) on the transformation of meanings into recognisable by everyone (and therefore uncontested) *knowledge*. On the links of trust and responsibility with distance and ‘territory’ see Giddens (1990).
- [12] E.g. escorting the interviewer after leaving all the way to the place they regarded as the end of their jurisdiction, their ‘village’ (often the interviewer’s car or the nearby train station) or their offering generously.
- [13] The phrases often accompanying this finding ‘the woman does the dishes’, ‘we do not trust them [the dishwashers], we prefer hands’, suggests that not having this particular household equipment is more culturally than financially related.
- [14] One out of three self-employed or business-owners are ethnic Greeks. They are active the service and constructions sector: small shops, kiosks, market vendors, other small enterprises (like furniture refurbishing, textile repairs, shoemaker, buildings cleaning), small take-away food shops and cafes, hair-dresser’s, construction and a paper factory. Albanians are entering occupations previously closed to them, such as chief cooks in restaurants, sales personnel, nurses, civil servants and school teachers.
- [15] The confusion amongst Albanians self-definition in other than ‘political’ terms constitutes a reaction to the exploitation they experience(d) from two polities and is not vacant of political meaning response.

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## Appendix

### Basic Characteristics of the Sample

Fieldwork research on Albanian immigrants was conducted in Athens between September and November 2003 with ‘snowball’ sampling procedure. It consist of 501 structured interviews with Albanian immigrants (questionnaires addressed to the head of the household). 331 were men, while 178 women.




Figure A1 Length of Stay Since First Arrival (Men)




Figure A2 Length of Stay Since First Arrival (Women)





Figure A3 Age Distribution

**Figure A4** Household Monthly Income (Frequency Distribution)**Table A1** Previous Employment Experience (In Albania)

Employment in Albania	Gender		Total
	Man	Woman	
Industrial worker	34	20	54
State employee	69	18	87
Farmer/livestockfarmer	41	17	58
Craftsmen	62	4	66
Housewives		52	52
Professional		1	1
Enterprise employee	12	11	23
Pupil-student	79	34	113
Unemployed	13	12	25
Other	16	5	21
Don't know/answer	5	4	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>331</b>	<b>178</b>	<b>509</b>

**Table A2** Hours of Work Per Week in Main Employment

	Frequency	Percent
40 hours per week	144	38.4
Over 40 hrs per week	171	45.6
30-40 hrs per week	25	6.7
30-20 hrs per week	9	2.4
Under 20hrs per week	6	1.6
No fixed timetable	20	5.4
Total (missing: unemployed, self-employed)	375	100.0

**Table A3** Employees' Monthly Pay (Men)

Monthly pay in euros	Frequency	Percent
Up to 299	2	0.7
300–599	40	13.9
600–699	53	18.4
700–799	64	22.2
800–899	56	19.4
900–1199	52	18.1
1200–1499	13	4.5
1500 and above	4	1.4
Don't know/answer	4	1.4
Total	288	100.0

**Table A4** Employees' Monthly Pay (Women)

Monthly pay in euros	Frequency	Percent	Valid percent
Up to 299	14	7.9	13.5
300–599	46	25.8	44.2
600–699	26	14.6	25.0
700–799	14	7.9	13.5
800–899	4	2.2	3.8
Total	104	58.4	100.0
Total	178	100.0	

**Table A5** Monthly Pay (All Employees)

Monthly pay in euros	Frequency	Percent
Up to 299	16	4.1
300–599	86	21.9
600–699	79	20.2
700–799	78	19.9
800–899	60	15.3
900–1199	52	13.3
1200–1499	13	3.3
1500 and above	4	1.0
Don't know/ answer	4	1.0
Total	392	100.0

**Table A6** Size of Enterprise by Male Employment

Number of employees in your firm	Current male employment				Total
	Industry,primary+ tertiary sector	Other	Construction		
1–10	Number	64	26	91	181
	%	63.4	49.1	67.4	62.6
11–19	Number	20	6	20	46
	%	19.8	11.3	14.8	15.9
20–49	Number	12	1	5	18
	%	11.9	1.9	3.7	6.2
50+	Number	2	3	5	10
	%	2.0	5.7	3.7	3.5
None	Number	1	1	2	4
	%	1.0	1.9	1.5	1.4
Do not work in firm	Number	1	12	7	20
	%	1.0	22.6	5.2	6.9
Work with small group of people	Number	1	2	5	8
	%	1.0	3.8	3.7	2.8
Work with big group of people	Number		2		2
	%		3.8		0.7
Total	Number	101	53	135	289
	%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0